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Economies of Scope in European Railways: 
An Efficiency Analysis 
Abstract 
In the course of railway reforms in the end of the last century, national European gov-
ernments, as well the EU Commission, decided to open markets and to separate railway 
networks from train operations. Vertically integrated railway companies  – companies 
owning a network and providing transport services – argue that such a separation of in-
frastructure and operations would diminish the advantages of vertical integration and 
would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. In this paper, we conduct a 
pan-European analysis to investigate the performance of European railways with a par-
ticular focus on economies of vertical integration. We test the hypothesis that integrated 
railways realise economies of joint production and, thus, produce railway services on a 
higher level of efficiency. To determine whether joint or separate production is more ef-
ficient  we  apply  a Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping model 
which relates the efficiency for integrated production to a virtual reference set consisting 
of the separated production technology. Our findings are that in a majority of European 
Railway companies exist economies of scope. 
 
Keywords: Efficiency, Vertical Integration, Railway Industry 
 
JEL-Classification: L22, L43, L92  
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Zusammenfassung 
Im Zuge der Reformen der europäischen Eisenbahnindustrie entschieden die nationalen 
Regierungen Europas sowie die EU Kommission, die Eisenbahnmärkte zu liberalisieren 
und die Schieneninfrastruktur vom Fahrbetrieb organisatorisch zu trennen. Vertikal in-
tegrierte Eisenbahnunternehmen – Unternehmen, die sowohl das Schienennetz als auch 
den Transportbetrieb unterhalten – äußern die Befürchtung, daß eine solche Separierung 
Vorteile der vertikalen Integration (sogenannte Verbundvorteile) vermindern würde und 
somit nicht geeignet sei, die gesamtgesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt zu erhöhen. In diesem 
Aufsatz untersuchen wir mittels einer pan-europäischen Analyse die Produktivität euro-
päischer Eisenbahnunternehmen und berücksichtigen dabei insbesondere etwaige Ver-
bundvorteile indem wir überprüfen, ob integrierte Eisenbahnunternehmen eine höhere 
technische Effizienz aufweisen als vertikal separierte Unternehmen. Dazu berechnen wir 
ein Data Envelopment Analysis super-efficiency bootstrapping Modell, das die Effizienz 
der integrierten Produktionstechnologie im Verhältnis zu einer Referenzgruppe virtuel-
ler, aus den separierten Unternehmen konstruierter Beobachtungseinheiten berechnet. 
Unsere Forschungsergebnisse weisen auf existierende Verbundvorteile für die Mehrzahl 
der europäischen Eisenbahnunternehmen hin. 
 
Stichworte: Effizienz, Verbundvorteile, Eisenbahnindustrie  
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1  Introduction 
In the late eighties and early nineties of the last century, national European governments, 
as well the EU Commission, decided to introduce competitive elements into the railway 
sector. The railway sector had been seen as performing poorly due to high subsidy re-
quirements and an increasingly falling market share compared to other modes of trans-
portation. The predominant means of restructuring industry had been the opening of 
markets and the separation of infrastructure from operations (Nash and Rivera, 2004). 
However, in many European countries vertical integrated firms still own the railway in-
frastructure and even participate on the transport segment. Although they are obliged to 
grant access to the infrastructure to third parties and to organisationally separate the in-
frastructure and transportation business, there is still a potential for market foreclosure. 
An expanded institutional unbundling in the means of complete ownership separation 
could eliminate this problem. Some European countries, like the United Kingdom and 
Sweden, already implemented new institutional arrangements: in the particular countries 
a state-controlled firm owns the infrastructure and provides network access and services 
to numerous competitive transportation firms. In other countries, such as Germany or 
Austria, the railway sector is still dominated by integrated incumbents. These firms ar-
gue that an institutional separation would diminish the advantages of vertical integration 
and would therefore not be suitable to raise economic welfare. Such economies of scope 
could result either from technical advantages or transactional advantages of joint pro-
duction. If these would be in existence then an integrated market structure would be ef-
ficient; if not, a separation with competition in transport operations would be advanta-
geous. 
Following this argumentation a decision in favour or against institutional separation ne-
cessitates an analysis concerning potential economies of scope within the railway sector. 
Previous research (for instance Bitzan, 2003 or Ivaldi and McCullough, 2004) addressed 
this issue without actually comparing different production technologies and was based 
on a single country level only. In this paper, we conduct a cross-country analysis to in-
vestigate the performance of European railways with particular focus on economies of 
scope. Our sample consists of about 50 railway companies from 27 European countries, 
observed over a period of five years from 2000 to 2004. The companies represent a vari-
ety of different firm sizes, input-output combinations and, most importantly, different 
institutional settings, namely vertically integrated railways and unbundled network and 
train operators. To test the hypothesis that integrated railways – companies owning a 
network and providing transport services – realise vertical and/or horizontal economies 
of scope, we analyse if integrated companies are relatively more technically efficient 
compared to unbundled railways by applying a distance function model. In contrast to 
previous research, this allows us to refrain from determining the firms’ maximisation  
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concern, which is crucial for a sample of regulated companies.1 Our analysis adopts a 
two step approach. In the first step we estimate technical efficiency of integrated and 
non-integrated railways using data envelopment analysis (DEA). In order to make a set 
of non-integrated railways comparable to the integrated railways we follow a suggestion 
by Morita (2002) and construct virtually integrated firms from samples of different un-
bundled firms. Subsequently, in the second step, we determine whether joint or separate 
production is more efficient. Therefore, we apply a DEA super-efficiency model, which 
relates the efficiency for the integrated production to a reference set consisting of the 
separate production technology. 
This paper aims to fill the void in previous research and empirically analyses on the 
question of whether economies of scope in railways exist or not. For that purpose, we 
calculate the relative efficiency of integrated railways compared to separated network 
and railway service operators. The outline for the remainder of this paper is as follows. 
The theoretical foundations and previous literature are presented in Section 2. Section 3 
discusses methodology. In Section 4 we introduce the modelling approach and describe 
the data. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains conclusions 
and highlights policy implications and directions for future research. 
                                                 
1  For discussion of distance functions in favour of cost or revenue functions, see Coelli and Perelman 
(2000) and section three of this paper.  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 5/2006  7
2  Efficiency and economies of scope 
The main argument against vertical and horizontal separation (or the unbundling of ser-
vices respectively) in the railway industry has been the potential existence of significant 
economies of scope. However, empirical evidence for scope economies in railways is 
scarce. This section provides a theoretical overview on the conditions of economies of 
scope and their possible sources in railway industries. We then review previous research 
on efficiency and scope economies in railways and present the ability of non-parametric 
frontier techniques measuring economies of scope. 
Economies of scope arise, in general, when cost savings can be realised due to a joint 
production of goods. Hence, it is more efficient to produce a certain output vector by a 
single firm than separately in two or more firms. Technically, economies of scope occur 
when the costs of producing the output vector Yi, i= 1,…,m, jointly are lower than the 
costs  of  producing  the  same  output  vector  separately  (Baumol,  Panzar  and  Willig, 
1982): 
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1 1
  (1) 
Diseconomies of scope occur when that inequality is reversed. For the case of railway 
production, the output vector may be divided into infrastructure management (YI), pas-
senger  transportation  (YP)  and  freight  transportation  (YF).  Vertical  and/or  horizontal 
economies of scope exist when the inequality 
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holds: any linear combination of outputs - apart from complete joint production itself - 
comes at higher cost than joint production. If this applies to railway production an inte-
grated market solution with only one firm is favourable to a separated institutional ar-
rangement, where the infrastructure manager is institutionally separated from passenger 
and freight operators. 
The main argument in favour of economies of scope in the railway industry is that of po-
tential transaction costs savings within an integrated organisation: Railway services are 
characterised  by  a  high level  of  technological  and  transactional  interdependence  be-
tween infrastructure and operations. This includes long-term capacity allocation, secu-
rity management, timetable coordination and investment planning as well as every day 
operational decisions on traffic coordination like train length, train speed or emergency  
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service. Technologically, all these activities can be organised within a hierarchical (inte-
grated) structure as well as within a contractual market structure among separated firms. 
Depending on the amount of transaction costs either one has to be preferred.2 
Supporters of an integrated structure argue for an increase in costs in a separated struc-
ture as with a rise in the numbers of operators the number of contract negotiations as 
well as technical and organisational interfaces will rise. While for real-time traffic coor-
dination this argument does most likely not hold it may be a consideration in efficient 
long term allocation: real time traffic coordination costs do not depend on the number of 
operators on the network but on the number of the train movements. As long as only one 
network firm – either integrated or separated – is responsible for this production stage 
no significant transaction cost differences should be expected (Knieps, 2004). In opposi-
tion to this, identifying the efficient institutional arrangement for long term capacity al-
location is rather sophisticated. Especially long-term investment decisions may differ 
among one integrated and several separated firms. Any decision, on either operations or 
infrastructure investment, needs comprehensive information about other parts of the sys-
tem. For example, a passenger operator investing in high speed trains has to be sure that 
the track system is capable to provide high speed transportation. On the other hand, the 
infrastructure provider has to know what kind of capacity at what time and at what place 
is needed. Such coordination is information intensive. Whether this interaction can be 
provided at lower transaction costs within an integrated or separated structure cannot be 
identified easily. On a first glance, the number of participating firms in a separated sys-
tem gives reason to assume the integrated system being favourable. Moreover, the flow 
of information in a widely branched inter-firm structure also bears huge risks of increas-
ing information and hence transaction costs. 
In relation to this another problem of long-term capacity allocation arises due to differ-
ent investment incentives within the two possible institutional arrangements. For exam-
ple, an integrated infrastructure provider and transport operator has an incentive to in-
vest in network infrastructure in order to prevent his rolling stock from wear and tear. In 
a separated system, with other firms owning the rolling stock, this incentive disappears 
(Mulder et al., 2005). Analogous, a separated transport operator has no incentive to in-
vest into his rolling stock to reduce the wear and tear of the tracks only. Hence, within a 
separated system the coordination of long term investment determines more (cost inten-
sive) interactions and negotiations between the production stages. However, within an 
integrated organisation the lack of competition and the direct monetary connection be-
tween performance and counter-performance may result in an inefficient – also cost in-
tensive – resource allocation. The question of which effect is being dominant remains 
hard to answer. Recapitulating, the discussion above shows how complex the interde-
pendencies between infrastructure and operations are and hence how difficult the task of 
judging for or against economies of scope is. Thus, the optimal institutional arrangement 
in the railway sector becomes an empirical question. 
                                                 
2  For a detailed description of transaction costs theory see Williamson 1975 and 1985.  
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Studies with specific focus on vertical separation and economies of scope are rather few. 
In a paper from 2003 Bitzan uses a data set of 30 US Class I freight railways covering 
the years 1983-97 to evaluate the cost implications of competition in the US rail freight 
industry.  The  results  obtained  by  estimating  a  translog  quasi-cost  function  indicate 
economies of vertical integration, suggesting that vertical separation leads to increased 
costs.  However,  considering  different  technological  characteristics  in  other  countries 
Bitzan restricts his findings to the US freight railway industry. Especially the European 
railway  systems  with  usually  much  smaller  networks  and  a  high  passenger  fraction 
within the combined passenger and freight operations may lead to other cost implica-
tions of competition and/or separation from his point of view. Ivaldi and McCullough 
(2004) use a comparable data set of 22 US Class I freight railways covering the years 
1978-2001. They evaluate the technological feasibility of separating vertically integrated 
firms into an infrastructure company and competing operating firms. The results ob-
tained by estimating a generalized McFadden cost function indicate vertical as well as 
horizontal economies of scope in a technological sense. The authors state that vertical 
separation may lead to a 20-40 percent cost disadvantage over a vertically integrated 
system and to even greater disadvantages if bulk and general freight operations are sepa-
rated likewise. Nevertheless, since observing integrated firms in the sample only, Ivaldi 
and McCullough restrict their findings to pure technological effects of separation. Nei-
ther the effects of transaction costs, in an integrated compared to a separated system, nor 
the effects of competition have been assessed. Additionally, like Bitzan, they consider 
different rail system characteristics in other countries and hence restrict their findings to 
the US rail freight system. 
Cantos-Sanchez (2001) estimates a translog cost function from a panel of 12 European 
state-owned railways for the period 1973-90. His findings report cost substitutability be-
tween track infrastructure and passenger operations but cost complementarity between 
track infrastructure and freight operations. That is, higher track costs lead to lower pas-
senger operation costs as well as higher freight operation costs. This result gives an in-
dication for diseconomies of scope between passenger and freight operations. However, 
considering the risk that separated firms do not account for these interdependencies, this 
finding also gives reason to assume that there are benefits of vertical integration, as 
Nash and Rivera-Trujillo (2004) state. 
A recent study on European railways by Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2004) investigates the 
impact of policy reforms on 12 European national railway firms. By applying a produc-
tion frontier model they compare passenger traffic efficiency for the period 1980-00, in 
which most of the European railway markets were reformed. They find that the imple-
mentation of reforms gradually improves efficiency whereas multiple reforms imple-
mented simultaneously only have at best neutral effects. Controlling for the effect of 
separation Friebel et al. show that there are no significant differences in efficiency be-
tween fully integrated companies and organizationally separated firms, but that full in-
stitutional separation has a positive effect on efficiency. However, this analysis only 
holds when the United Kingdom is excluded from the dataset. Furthermore, the results  
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indicate that – in general – smaller railway firms (firm size being measured in terms of 
network length) have improved efficiency more than firms of larger size. 
Overall, previous research on the economics of vertical integration in railways shows 
that the impact of scope economies on the efficiency of railway systems is still ambigu-
ous. Aside from that, several important issues, such as different production technologies 
in integrated and separated organisational arrangements and limitations due to specific 
behavioural assumptions, have not been addressed so far. Therefore, in order to estimate 
scope economies in technological and especially transactional sense we apply data en-
velopment analysis (DEA). Our pan-European data set incorporates railway firms from 
27 European countries for the period 2000-04. In contrast to pervious studies the data 
includes not only integrated railway firms, but separated firms, differentiated between 
infrastructure managers, passenger operators and freight operators. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study using this kind of data in a European railway efficiency compari-
son. Furthermore, considering the estimation technique we compare two different pro-
duction frontiers of separated and integrated firms rather than analysing one frontier de-
rived from all firms, as done in most previous work. Thus we explicitly incorporate dif-
ferent production technologies. Several variations of this technique can be found in Fer-
rier et al. (1993), Prior (1996), Fried, Schmidt and Yaisawarng (1998), Prior and Sola 
(2000), Kittelsen and Magnussen (2003) and Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2003), evaluating 
scope and diversification economies in the banking, hospital, health care and insurance 
sector.  
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3  Methodology 
To specify a multiple-output multiple-input production technology we apply the distance 
function approach proposed by Shephard (1953, 1970). Compared to other representati-
ons of technologies, such as cost or revenue functions, it requires no specific behaviou-
ral objectives such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation, which are likely to be 
violated in the case of partly state-owned and highly regulated industries as European 
railways (Coelli and Perelman, 2000). 
Distance functions can be differentiated into input-oriented and output-oriented distance 
functions. The input orientation assumes that the output set is determined by exogenous 
factors and hence that the influence of firms on output quantities is limited; the output 
orientation assumes exactly the same for the input set. For railways, both versions can 
be appropriate. Supporting the input-orientated approach one could argue that the de-
mand for outputs is influenced highly by macro-economic factors (e.g. customer den-
sity) as well as state-controlled public transport requirements. A major aspect in favour 
of an output-oriented approach is the existence of hardly controllable input factors, for 
example political influence on capital expenditures (Coelli and Perelman, 1999). But 
since we use a constant return to scale estimation approach where the input-oriented dis-
tance measure equals the output oriented distance measure in reciprocal terms, we limit 
our model to the input-orientation.3 
Modelling a production technology as an input distance function one can investigate 
how much the input vector can be proportionally reduced holding the output vector 
fixed. Assuming that the technology satisfies the standard properties listed in Färe and 
Primont (1995) it can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( )}, / : max{ , y L x y x D I Î = q q   (3) 
where the input set L(y) represents the set of all input vectors x that can produce the 
output vector y. The function is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous and 
concave  in  x,  and  increasing  in  y  (Lovell  et  al.,  1994).  From  xÎL(y)  follows 
1 ) , ( ³ y x DI . A value equal to unity identifies the respective firm as being fully efficient 
and located on the frontier of the input set. Values greater than unity belong to input sets 
within the frontier indicating inefficient firms. 
In order to estimate the distance functions and obtain information about technical effi-
ciency and scope economies of European railways we use data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), a method introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). DEA is a non-
parametric approach which constructs a piece-wise linear production frontier enveloping 
all observed data points. This production frontier can be estimated either under constant 
returns to scale (CRS) or under variable returns to scale (VRS). We follow the CRS ap-
                                                 
3  The output-oriented model is defined in a similar way (see for instance Coelli and Perelman 1999).  
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proach, assuming that the observed firms can alter their size and hence identify firms 
departing from optimal scale as inefficient.4 
Taking it as given  that the firms use K inputs and M outputs the CRS input-oriented 
frontier is calculated by solving the following linear optimization program for each of N 
firms: 
, max q  
 s.t.  , 0 ³ + - l Y yi   (4) 
  , 0 / ³ - l q X xi  
  , 0 ³ l  
where X is the K´N matrix of inputs and Y the M´N matrix of outputs. The i-th firm’s 
input and output vectors are represented by xi and yi respectively. l  is a N´1 vector of 
constants and q  is the input distance measure. As defined earlier in this section this 
measure indicates a firm’s technical (in)efficiency.5 
To  analyze  economies  of  scope  in  the  railway  sector  we  calculate  so  called  super-
efficiency scores in a second step. Super-efficiency measures can be obtained by calcu-
lating the efficiency of one group of observations relative to a production technology de-
fined by another, reference group of observations; i.e., we compare the efficiency of in-
tegrated railway firms relative to the efficiency frontier of non-integrated railway firms. 
In order to obtain a comparable set of non-integrated firms we follow a suggestion from 
Morita (2002) and construct virtually integrated firms from samples of different sepa-
rated firms: assume, for example, that there are two kinds of products, A and B, which 
could be produced separately in two firms or jointly in one firm. There are n
A firms pro-
ducing only A, n
B firms producing only B and n
AB firms producing both A and B. These 
firms can be compared by combining the n
A firms with the n
B firms receiving a number 
of n
A´n
B virtual firms. These virtual firms use the same inputs to produce the same out-
puts as the n
AB firms, but producing them under an alternative production technology. 
For J integrated firms and S non-integrated firms, the input distance function for an in-
tegrated firm j relative to the non-integrated firms` frontier can be defined as: 
                                                 
4  In contrast, the VRS approach compares firms within similar scale; assuming VRS is appropriate 
when due to exogenous determinants (e.g. regulatory framework and political influence) the firm size 
cannot be influenced by the management directly. Although this may still be the case in some Euro-
pean railway industries we argue that an efficiency comparison should consider the long-term eco-
nomic perspective, including increasing European deregulation and integration, i.e., less country spe-
cific regulation and political influence.  
5  Note that this is the Shepard measure of technical efficiency. The corresponding Farrell measure can 
be obtained by taking the reciprocal of the Shepard distance function (see for instance Wilson 2005).  
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( ) ( ) ( )}, / : max{ , j
S
j j j S y L x y x D Î = q q  j = 1, 2,…, J  (5) 
where L
S(yj) represents the set of all input vectors x of the non-integrated firms that can 
produce the output vector yj. In contrast to a company’s input distance function value 
calculated within its own group (which is greater or equal to unity), the relative effi-
ciency value calculated to a reference set of the other companies’ group can take values 
between zero and infinity. 
The corresponding CRS super efficiency model is calculated by solving the following 
linear optimisation program J times for each of the integrated firms: 
, max j q  
 s.t.  , 0 ³ + - s s j Y y l   j = 1, 2,…, J  (6) 
  , 0 / ³ - s s j j X x l q   s = 1, 2,…, S 
  , 0 ³ s l  
where Xs is the K´N input matrix and Ys the M´N output matrix of all non-integrated 
firms; xj is the input vector and yj the output vector of the evaluated integrated firm, and 
s l  is a N´1 vector of constants of the separated firms. If the input distance function 
value, i.e. the super efficiency score, for the evaluated firm  j q  is lower than unity the in-
tegrated firm is dominant to (more efficient than) the non-integrated frontier, whereas a 
value greater than unity indicates a dominance of the non-integrated firms` frontier to 
the evaluated firm. However, if for the integrated firm the input distance function value 
relative to its own group q  is also greater than unity, the firm is dominated by its own 
group’s frontier also. Hence, considering the super efficiency scores only is not suffi-
cient to identify the favourable technology or the existence of economies (diseconomies) 
of scope. Consequently, as suggested by Cummins, Weiss and Zi (2003) we measure the 
distance between the two production frontiers by calculating the ratio of the efficiency 
and super efficiency scores. 
To illustrate this one can consider non-integrated and integrated firms producing a sin-
gle output with two inputs. The two input production frontiers are shown in Figure 1 
where the production frontier for the integrated firms is labelled Lj(y), and the produc-
tion frontier for non-integrated firms is labelled Ls(y).6 Firms being fully efficient oper-
ate on their respective frontier and hence show distance function (efficiency) values 
relative to their own group equalling unity. Economies (diseconomies) of scope, for all 
observations, can be identified if the production frontiers do not intersect and the inte-
                                                 
6  Figure 1 and its description follow Cummins, Weis and Zi (2003)  
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grated (non-integrated) frontier places closer to the origin. If the two production fron-
tiers exhibit an intersection point as shown in figure 1, economies of scope for some op-
erating observations and diseconomies of scope for other operating observations can be 
identified. 
Figure 1:  























For example, assume an integrated firm operating at point A in Figure 1. The distance 
function  value  relative  to  the  integrated  frontier  is  1 0 / 0 > = D A q   and  the  distance 
function value relative to the separated frontier, which is  1 0 / 0 > = B A j q  indicate this 
firm being dominated by its own and the other group’s frontier. In order to measure 
which frontier places closer to the origin and hence to test if economies or diseconomies 













  (7) 
Since the distance function value of point A relative to the integrated frontier is greater 
than its efficiency score, calculated with respect to the separated frontier, the ratio from 
formula 6 is greater than unity, indicating the integrated (‘own’) frontier places closer to  
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the origin. Hence, for this firm, economies of scope can be identified. The opposite case 
– diseconomies of scope – can be shown for an integrated firm operating at point E. 
While both distance function values – relative to its own frontier  F E 0 / 0 = q  and rela-
tive to the other group’s frontier  0 /0 j E G q =  – are greater than unity again, the ratio 
F G j 0 / 0 / = q q  is smaller than unity, since the separated frontier places closer to the 
origin than the integrated frontier. In summary, if the ratio is greater (lower) than unity a 
firm’s own frontier dominates (is dominated by) the other group’s frontier and if the ra-
tio is lower than unity the own frontier is dominated by the other group’s frontier for any 
production point. Hence, for integrated firms a ratio greater than unity indicates econo-
mies of scope and a ratio lower than unity indicates diseconomies of scope. 
Since DEA efficiency measures are only point estimators calculated within a finite sam-
ple, they are highly sensitive to sampling variations and errors in the data, and lack 
common statistical properties. In order to overcome this shortcoming, we apply a boot-
strap procedure. Bootstrapping, introduced by Efron (1979), is based on the idea that 
when the original observed sample mimics the underlying population, every random 
draw from this sample with replacement can be treated as a sample from the underlying 
population itself. It is used when the original sampling distribution of the estimator of 
interest, e.g. of the efficiency measures, is unknown. In general, the bootstrap of our ef-
ficiency estimates can be described as follows: We first compute the efficiency measure 
i qˆ  for each firm by DEA from the observed sample. After that, we generate a b-th 
(b=1,2,…,B) bootstrap sample 
*
b q  of size n with replacement from  i qˆ , i=1,…,n, and 
calculate the bootstrap estimate 
*
b qˆ  by using DEA. This procedure is repeated B times to 
obtain a set of estimates 
*
b qˆ , b=1,2…,B. Based on this sampling distribution the statisti-
cal properties of the estimated efficiency measures can be inferred.7 
One major drawback of the outlined procedure is that it assumes a continuous true dis-
tribution  F . However, especially in small samples with a large number of units identi-
fied as being fully efficient, the empirical distribution  F ˆ  of the efficiency scores is dis-
continuous with a positive probability mass at  1 = q . Hence, F ˆ  provides an inconsistent 
estimator of  F  (Cummins, Weiss and Zi, 2003). This problem can be solved with a 
smoothed bootstrap procedure, developed and extended by Simar and Wilson (1998, 
2000), where the empirical distribution  F ˆ  is smoothed using a Gaussian kernel density 
estimator. In our analysis we use this bootstrap procedure to estimate the bias and vari-
ance of the DEA efficiency estimates, and to construct confidence intervals. As recom-
mended by Hall (1986) we choose B=1000 bootstrap replications.8 
                                                 
7  For more details on the bootstrap see for instance Efron (1979) or Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  
8  For details of the procedure, please refer to Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000).  
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4  Modelling approach and data description 
The data set consists of 54 railway firms from 27 European countries throughout the pe-
riod 2000-2004. Considering every year as an independent observation we receive a 
sample of 152 observations in total.9 The data was mainly taken from the railway statis-
tics published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer (2004, 2005) and com-
bined with information from the companies’ annual reports and companies’ statistics. 
The firms are divided into four different groups: Integrated firms (IF), infrastructure 
managers (IM), passenger operators (PO) and freight operators (FO). Every group sells a 
different type of product, with the integrated firms offering all activities from a single 
source. The essential activity in railway operations is the infrastructure management 
which forms an indispensable requirement for transportation services. It is offered either 
by an infrastructure manager or an integrated firm and includes maintaining tracks, rail-
way stations or signal facilities as well as schedule-monitoring and system-control. The 
infrastructure manager coordinates train movements, provides emergency service for de-
fective  transport  devices  and  develops  time  tables.  Recapitulating  the  infrastructure 
manager’s tasks, he provides and sells network access and services to the transportation 
firms, subject to the condition of optimal capacity utilisation. We therefore use the vari-
able train-km driven on the network as an output measure for infrastructure managers.10 
The second activity in railway operations is transportation, which can be distinguished 
between  passenger  and  freight  transportation.  It  is  provided  by  passenger  operators, 
freight operators or integrated firms. Since – for passenger operators – revenues depend 
on the number of passengers and the distance travelled, we use the variable passenger-
km as an output measure. The freight operators’ revenues depend on the amount and dis-
tance of tonnes transported. Hence, the corresponding output variable freight tonne-km 
is used. 
Considering the input variables we specify two different models. While the first model 
(Model I) is based on physical measures for the input factors only, the second model 
(Model II) also takes a monetary figure into account. In the first model, number of em-
ployees, number of rolling stock and net length are used as physical measures for labor 
and capital input. In the second model, the ‘physical’ variables number of employees and 
number of rolling stock are substituted by the monetary variable operating expenditure 
(OPEX). The variable represents the total operating expenses, including the costs of 
                                                 
9  The difference between 270 observations having full data coverage and the lower value of de facto 
152 observations results from market entries later than 2000 and missing data mainly of 2004. Assu-
ming every year as an independent observation includes effects of technical progress and catching-up 
in the efficiency scores. However, long asset live in relation to the rather short observed time period 
of five years suggests these effects as negligible (Affuso, Angeriz and Politt, 2002). 
10  The data on train-kms driven on the network was published first for the year 2003 by the Union In-
ternationale des Chemins de Fer (UIC). If available, the data for preceding years was taken from the 
annual reports. If not available, the train-km values of the biggest passenger and freight operators in 
the specific country where taken to approximate the value.  
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staff, materials, external charges, taxes, depreciation, value adjustments and provisions 
for contingencies. Although this variable already includes capital costs we still use the 
variable net length as a proxy for capital stock. We consider net length – as a long life 
asset – as a quasi-fixed input mainly built in the past and financed by capital grants from 
the  government.11  Furthermore  it  reflects  the  cost  impact  of  differences  in  network 
structure and density (Smith, 2004). 
Both models have advantages and disadvantages. The usage of physical measures for in-
ternational comparison neglects the differences in relative factor prices among the coun-
tries; on the other hand, using monetary values raises the problem of differences in price 
levels, accounting rules and currency conversion. To limit this problem we follow Ja-
masb and Pollitt (2003) by converting the financial data of operating costs into one 
monetary unit, the euro. By applying purchasing power parities provided by Eurostat 
(Eurostat, 2004) instead of conventional exchange rates, we account not only for cur-
rency conversion but also for differences in price levels and purchasing power among 
the  countries.  Nevertheless,  the  problem  of varying accounting standards among the 
countries remains. We estimate both models and check for differences by comparing the 
results therefore. 
Table 1 shows the firms sorted after their type of activity and the selected variables. 
While for integrated firms all described input and output variables are part of their cor-
responding production technology, the variable set for the non-integrated firms – pas-
senger operators, freight operators and infrastructure managers – differ by their type of 
activity. In order to estimate economies of scope we use the parameter values of non-
integrated  firms  to  construct  virtually  integrated firms,  which are comparable to the 
really integrated firms: every infrastructure manager is combined with every passenger 
and every freight operator by accumulating their individual parameter values. A new 
group of virtually integrated firms (VF) is generated, using a comparable production 
technology, since those VF share the same inputs and produce the same outputs as ‘real’ 
integrated firms. 
                                                 
11  This approach has been used quite frequently in previous literature, see Cantos, Pastor and Serrano 
(2002) for a short review.   
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Table 1: 
Variables sorted by type of activity and model specification 





No. of Rolling 
stock 
Total 
costs   Net length   Train-km   Pass.-km   Tonne-km  
IF  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
IM  √    √  √  √     
PO  √  √  √      √   
FO  √  √  √        √ 
VF  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the summary statistics of the data used in the each model, classi-
fied for ‘real’ integrated and ‘virtually’ integrated firms. The number of observations of 
‘real’ integrated firms differs slightly between the estimated models – 75 observations 
for Model I and 73 observations for Model II – due to missing data. The observations of 
‘virtually’ integrated firms in Model I are generated by combining 33 observations of in-
frastructure managers with 16 observations of passenger operators and 11 observations 
of freight operators. In total, we obtain a number of 5808 ‘virtually’ integrated firms for 
this model. For Model II, 23 observations of infrastructure managers, 27 observations of 
passenger operators and 8 observations of freight observations are combined to a total 
number of 4968 ‘virtually’ integrated firms. Again, the difference in the numbers is due 
to missing data. To eliminate extreme virtual input-output combinations, we adjust the 
sub-sample of ‘virtually’ integrated firms for outliers by applying the method suggested 
by Hadi (1992, 1994), which identifies multiple outliers in multivariate data. For Model 
I, 2508 observations were dropped, leaving 3330 observations of ‘virtual’ integrated 
firms. Data for Model II is adjusted for 2160 outliers, leaving 2808 observations of ‘vir-
tual’ integrated firms in total.12 
                                                 
12  This large number of outliers identified, results from a high fraction of ‘unrealistic’ virtual input/ 
output combinations, combinations of very large infrastructure managers with small passenger opera-
tors for instance.  
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Table 2: 
Model I – Summary statistics 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms  ‘Virtually’ integrated firms 
  Mean  Max  Min  Mean  Max  Min 
No. of  employees  50517  249251  952  12870  36192  3465 
No. of rolling 
stock  40351  219574  223  4981  11893  747 
Network length 
(in km)  7331  36588  180  4665  9882  2047 
Passenger-km 
(in millions)  11494  74459  126  4653  6621  2204 
Tonne-km 
(in millions)  14258  76815  14  4952  13120  107 
Train-km 
(in thousands)  134764  988200  2382  63158  128000  22667 
No. of  
observations  75  3300 
 
Table 3: 
Model II – Summary statistics 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms  ‘Virtually’ integrated firms 
  Mean  Max  Min  Mean  Max  Min 
OPEX 
(in millions of €)  3281  29669  79  1439  3927  329 
Network length 
(in km)  7474  36588  180  4055  5854  2273 
Passenger-km 
(in millions)  11779  74459  126  4795  14666  7 
Tonne-km 
(in millions)  14400  76815  14  5854  13120  456 
Train-km 
(in thousands)  137999  988200  2382  45151  64341  36442 
No. of  
observations  73  2808 
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5  Results 
In this section, we present the results of the estimated models. First, we analyse the 
technical efficiency results obtained by the DEA bootstrap procedure. We then extend 
the discussion to the evaluation of contingent economies of scope. 
Analysing the DEA bootstrap estimation results (Table 4), the following conclusions 
can be drawn. For both models, the bias-corrected distance function values are greater 
than the original efficiency scores on average, indicating that a standard DEA approach 
without a bootstrap procedure tends to overestimate efficiency in our sample. For Model 
I (Model II) the average distance function value for the ‘real’ integrated firms is cor-
rected by about 14% (6 percent) and the average efficiency value for the ‘virtually’ inte-
grated firms by about 2 percent (1 percent), suggesting that bias-correction especially in 
small – data sensitive – samples is essential for correct efficiency results. 
Table 4: 
Summary statistics of original and bias-corrected distance function (efficiency) results13 
Model I 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms  ‘Virtual’ integrated firms 
  Original  Bias corrected  Original  Bias corrected 
Mean         
Efficiency  1.8378  2.0924  1.3786  1.4008 
Standard deviation  0.7980  0.8837  0.3510  0.3552 
Minimum efficiency  3.9459  4.5140  2.5344  2.6080 
Maximum efficiency  1.0000  1.1597  1.0000  1.0024 
Model II 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms  ‘Virtual’ integrated firms 
  Original  Bias corrected  Original  Bias corrected 
Mean         
Efficiency  1.3466  1.4324  1.5202  1.5401 
Standard deviation  0.3975  0.4116  0.3878  0.3924 
Minimum efficiency  3.3012  3.4616  3.3123  3.4603 
Maximum efficiency  1.0000  1.0728  1.0000  1.0017 
                                                 
13  All estimations are made with FEAR: A package for frontier efficiency analysis with R (Wilson 2005).  
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For Model I, the estimated bias-corrected distance function value of 2.0924 for the ‘real’ 
integrated firms implies that, on average, the same output quantity could have been pro-
duced despite of reducing the input usage by more than 52 percent. However, the high 
standard deviation of 0.8837 shows that the mean distance function value includes nu-
merous extreme values. Comparing these results with Model II, where a monetary value 
OPEX is used instead of the physical variables number of employees and number of roll-
ing stock shows a lower standard deviation (0.4115) as well as a much lower bias-
corrected  distance  function  value  (1.4324),  indicating  a  possible  input  reduction  of 
about 30 percent on average. This suggests that the already addressed problem of physi-
cal measures – neglecting differences in relative factor prices among countries – has an 
influence on our Model I estimation results.14 
Table 5 shows the bias-corrected distance function results for the ‘real’ integrated firms 
in Model I. Both distance values – in respect to their own frontier (2.0924) and to the 
separated frontier (2.0961) – indicate a high level of inefficiency, suggesting a possible 
reduction of 52 percent in inputs, on average, to reach either one of the efficiency fron-
tiers.  The  average  ratio  of  the  distance  function  values  slightly  greater  than  unity 
(1.1109) suggest that the two frontiers place very close to each other, and that, on aver-
age, economies of scope can be assumed. However, since individually economies (dis-
economies) of scope may vary widely due to variation in the in- and output mix, a 
judgement  on  just  the  average  parameter  values  could  be  misleading.  Nevertheless, 
separating the firms into two groups – with an individual ratio of the distance function 
values  greater  unity  indicating  economies  of  scope  and  below  unity  indicating  dis-
economies of scope – identifies scope for 42 and diseconomies of scope for 33 observa-
tions. This equals to 56 percent and 44 percent of all observations, respectively. 
For Model II (Table 6), the estimated distance function value in respect to the ‘virtually’ 
integrated frontier (1.1932) indicates that, on average, a ‘real’ integrated firm needs an 
input reduction of about 16 percent to reach the efficiency frontier of the ‘virtually’ in-
tegrated firms. Compared to Model I, the standard deviation is reduced by more than 50 
percent, again indicating less extreme values in this model. The average distance func-
tions value ratio (1.4401) is greater than in Model I, implying increasing economies of 
scope when considering OPEX instead of the physical measures number of employees 
and rolling stock. Additionally, separating the sample into two groups – with regard to 
their individual ratio of the distance function values being greater or below unity – sug-
gests that 51 observations (70 percent) show economies of scope and 22 observations 
                                                 
14  To control for structural differences among the countries, we estimated a truncated regression and re-
gressed the efficiency scores of the real integrated companies upon GDP per capita, network density 
and population density. For the results of Model I, we found a significant and positive but very little 
influence of GDP per capita. For Model II, none of the variables had a significant influence on the ef-
ficiency scores.  
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(30 percent) diseconomies of scope. Hence, compared to Model I, a higher number of 
observations show economies of scope. 
Table 5: 
Bias-corrected distance function (efficiency) results - Model I 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms 





Mean  2.0924  2.0961  1.1109  0.8404  1.3236 
Standard deviation  0.8837  1.0954  0.3195  0.1614  0.2422 
Minimum  4.5140  4.8501  1.8848  0.9994  1.8848 
Maximum   1.1597  0.6804  0.3686  0.3686  1.0076 
No. of observations   75  33  42 
  (100)  (44 percent)  (56 percent) 
Table 6: 
Bias-corrected distance function (efficiency) results - Model II 
  ‘Real’ integrated firms 





Mean  1.4324  1.1932  1.4401  0.8514  1.6940 
Standard deviation  0.4116  0.4810  0.8252  0.0916  0.8711 
Minimum  3.4616  2.6297  4.0851  0.9963  4.0851 
Maximum   1.0728  0.2781  0.6007  0.6007  1.0170 
No. of observations   73  22  51 
  (100 percent)  (30 percent)  (70 percent) 
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6  Conclusions 
Our analysis of a sample of 50 railway companies from 27 European countries observed 
over a period of five years from 2000 to 2004 provides a first pan-European distance 
function approach addressing economies of scope in railways and confirms the findings 
from the U.S. Within a model using physical measures only, we find slight efficiency 
advantages for integrated companies on average and observe economies of scope for a 
majority  of  observations.  Including  monetary  figures,  more  precisely  operating  ex-
penses, produces even more explicit results: in a second model, we show that integrated 
railway  companies  are  on  average  relatively  more  efficient  than  virtually  integrated 
companies, and find that a clear majority (70 percent) of the railway companies ob-
served indicate economies of scope. 
Despite  these  results,  the  policy  implications  are  ambiguous;  indeed,  economies  of 
scope exist for a majority of integrated European railway companies. Future sector re-
structuring should be aware of that issue and avoid increasing transaction costs unneces-
sarily. On the other hand, not disentangling the railway sector further retains discrimina-
tory  incentives  and  complicates  regulation.  Policy makers should carefully outweigh 
positive and negative aspects of vertical integration in railways. 
Further research on economies of scope in the European railway industry should address 
dynamic aspects of market liberalisation and productivity development over time. Espe-
cially a company’s regulatory environment and its experience might have a significant 
impact on relative efficiency. Also, aspects of railway safety and quality of service need 
to be incorporated in order to control for issues of particular importance, probably nega-
tively correlated with a company’s level of cost.  
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